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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

ARMAND L. SMITH, Individually and
as Trustee for the Armand L. Smith, Jr.
And Shannon S. Windham Trusts, and
VIRGINIA L. SMITH, Individually,
Plaintiffs/Appellees,

PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation, n/k/a FAIRFAX
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS
LAND COMPANY, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership, and NORTH
PLAINS DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,
Defendants,

Case No. 200440675

The State Treasurer, Edward T. Alter of
the State of Utah, for and in behalf of
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Rule 19 Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(g)
(2001).
ISSUES. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND WHERE PRESERVED
1.

Whether the trial court was correct in determining that Utah Code

Ann.§78-18-1(3) (as originally enacted in 1989), does not give the State of Utah any
interest in the Judgment of the court when it was first issued and that the State's interest is
triggered when and if the punitive damages judgment is "paid" to the judgment creditor,
thereby resulting in a taking of plaintiffs' property by the State in violation of the Utah
and U.S. Constitutions.

STANDARD OF REVIEW: The standard of review for a trial court's
summary judgment ruling is for correctness. The appellate court will consider only
whether the trial court correctly applied the law and correctly concluded that no disputed
issues of material fact existed. Kessler v. Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, 16 P.3d 1225. There
is no deference given the trial court's legal conclusions. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah
Department of Trans.. 858 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVED: This issue is preserved in the State's Memorandum of Points
and Authorities in Opposition to Smiths' Motion For Summary Judgment. R.5344. It
was also preserved in the State's arguments before the trial court. R. 5990.
2.

Whether the State of Utah is entitled to the post-judgment interest

that accrued on the portion of the punitive damage judgment that is subject to Utah Code
Ann. §78-18-1(3) (as originally enacted in 1989).
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Because the trial court construed the statute to
find an unconstitutional taking, it did not rule on this issue. This notwithstanding, the
standard of review for a trial court's summary judgment ruling is for correctness. The
appellate court will consider only whether the trial court correctly applied the law and
correctly concluded that no disputed issues of material fact existed. Kessler v.
Mortenson, 2000 UT 95, 16 P.3d 1225. There is no deference given the trial court's legal
conclusions. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Department of Trans., 858 P..2d 1363 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVED: This issue is preserved at State's Memorandum Of Points
And Authorities In Opposition To Smith's Motion For Summary Judgment. R.5344. It
was also preserved in the State's arguments before the trial court on April 14, 2004 and
June 11,2004. R.5990.
2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND RULES
WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL
A.

Utah Code Ann. §78-18-l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989).
In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and
paid, 50% of the amount of punitive damages in excess of
$20,000 shall, after payment of attorney fees and costs, be
remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into the General
Fund.

B.

U.S. Const, amend. V.
. . . nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

C.

Utah Const, art. I, § 22.
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case

The State Treasurer for and in behalf of the State of Utah ("State") appeals
the Summary Judgment Order entered by the Honorable Frank G. Noel of the Third
District Court on June 24, 2004, wherein the court determined and declared that Utah
Code Ann.§78-18-l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989) on its face clearly does not give the
State any interest in the court's Judgment when it was first issued. As a result, the court
ruled that the Plaintiffs' interest vested in the entire judgment and the State's claim to a
portion of that judgment amounted to a taking of Plaintiffs' property in violation of the
Utah and U.S. Constitutions. The court therefore ruled that Utah Code Ann. §78-18l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989) is unconstitutional and unenforceable as against the
Plaintiffs.
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B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below

The following facts are not in dispute. The Honorable Frank G. Noel of the
Third District Court entered the judgment in the original case on June 29, 2001 in favor of
the Plaintiffs, Armand L. Smith, individually and as Trustee, and Virginia L. Smith
("Smiths") and against the Defendant, Price Development Company n/k/a Fairfax Realty,
Inc. ("Price Development"). R. 4498. The judgment included an award of punitive
damages in the amount of $5,500,000.00. R. 4504. Price Development appealed the
judgment to the Utah Supreme Court. R.4525. On October 3, 2003, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment in all respects with the exception of a reduction of
$93,000.00 in compensatory damages. R.4577. Price Development then filed a Writ of
Certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, which writ was denied on March 29, 2004. The
Utah Supreme Court then issued its Remittitur of the case on March 30, 2004. R.4592.
In anticipation of satisfaction of the judgment, the Smiths filed a motion to
join the State as a Rule 19 defendant for the purpose of determining the constitutionality
of one of the provisions of the Punitive Damage Awards Act, Utah Code Ann.§78-181(3)(1989). R.4629. The trial court granted the Smiths' motion and ordered that the State
be joined and the contested portion of the punitive damage judgment be deposited into a
mutually agreed interest bearing account until further order of the court. In addition, the
court set a briefing schedule for the parties to file motions and briefs regarding the issues
of the constitutionality of the Punitive Damage Awards Act. R.4695.
After the State was joined as a party, Price Development paid the Smiths'
portion of the punitive damages judgment and interest on that portion. In exchange, on
April 14, 2004 the Smiths executed a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment. R.4685. Price

Development paid the amount of the contested portion of the punitive damages judgment
and the interest that had accrued on that amount into a mutually agreed interest bearing
account as the court directed.
The Smiths subsequently applied to the court for judgment to be entered
against Price Development for their attorney fees and costs that were incurred on appeal.
R.4725. That motion remains pending.
There have been numerous amendments to the Punitive Damage Awards
Act since its enactment in 1989. In 2002, the Legislature clarified the definition of
attorneys' fees to be deducted and added Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1.5(2002) wherein the
clerk of the court is required to give notice to the state treasurer and the attorney general
of a punitive damage award. In 2004, the Legislature changed the statute to require the
judgment to specify that the judgment debtor is to pay the State a portion of the punitive
damages judgment. The 2004 amendments also gave the State standing as a judgment
creditor in collecting its portion of any punitive damages judgment.
The State acknowledged at the outset that the statute that applied to the
Smiths in this case was the statute as it was originally enacted in 1989. Transcript of
hearing on April 14, 2004 at 13. That statute states as follows:
In any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and
paid, 50% of the amount of punitive damages in excess of
$20,000 shall, after payment of attorney fees and costs, be
remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into the General
Fund.
The Smiths subsequently filed their motion for summary judgment and
argued that the entire punitive damage judgment vested in them on the date of judgment.
R.5226. The Smiths argued that the payment to the State of a portion of the judgment
5

represents a taking by the State of their vested interest in the judgment in violation of the
Utah and U.S. Constitutions. As a result, they argued that Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3)
(1989) is unconstitutional and unenforceable as against them. R.4617 and 5242. The
Smiths argued that the statute violated other constitutional provisions including the
separation of powers and equal protection clauses. R.5258. They conceded that the 2004
amendments may well have corrected the perceived constitutional problems and they
argued that these amendments were essentially an admission by the legislature that the
statute was constitutionally defective. R.5254.
The State argued that the punitive damages judgment was divided with the
State when the judgment was first entered on June 29, 2001. Therefore, only a portion of
the punitive damages judgment vested in the Smiths on that date. R.5348. Transcript of
hearing on April 14, 2004 at 20. Transcript of hearing on June 11, 2004 at 18. With the
Smiths having no interest in the State's portion of the punitive damage judgment, the
State argued that there was no taking of their property in violation of the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions. R.5354. The State also argued that the Punitive Damage Awards Act did
not violate other constitutional provisions. R.5361. The State also argued that the 2004
amendments clarified the intent of the Legislature that the punitive damages judgment
was divided at the time of the judgment. R.5353.
After having heard and been briefed on the parties' arguments, the trial
court determined that "the Smiths' property interests in the entire Judgment which is
entitled to constitutional protection, vested in the Judgment as of the date of its entry on
June 29, 2001." R.5430. Transcript of hearing on June 11, 2004 at 44. The trial court
reached this conclusion after ruling that the statute "on its face clearly does not give the

State Treasurer or the State of Utah any interest in the Judgment of this Court when first
issued, nor does it give the State any interest in the underlying cause of action. The
State's interest is triggered when and if the punitive damages Judgment is "paid" to the
payee, Judgment creditor in this case, the Smiths. To do as the State suggests, and rule
that the statute gives the State an interest in the Judgment when first issued, would require
this Court to read something into the statute that simply is not there. This the Court is
unwilling to do." R.5429. Transcript of hearing on June 11, 2004 at 44.
The trial court made it clear that the court's ruling was based entirely on the
language of the 1989 statute and not on the statute as amended or whether split-recovery
statutes in general are unconstitutional. R.5430. Transcript of hearing on June 11, 2004 at
45. Having ruled as it did, the trial court did not feel that it needed to go into more detail
and it ruled that it was not necessary to rule on the arguments made on the separation of
powers or the equal protection clauses of the constitution. R.5430.
Because the issue of post-judgment attorneys' fees in the original case was
still pending before the court, the State motioned the court pursuant to Rule 54 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure to determine that its Summary Judgment Order dated June 24,
2004 is the court's final judgment against the State. R.5431. The court granted the State's
motion on July 9, 2004. R.5488. The State filed its notice of appeal to this court on July
19,2004. R.5648.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the trial court ignored long-standing rules of statutory construction,
it's interpretation of the Punitive Damage Awards Act is incorrect. Utah Code Ann.§7818-1(3) (as originally enacted in 1989) plainly states that in any judgment where punitive
7

damages are awarded and paid, 50% of the amount of punitive damages shall, after
deducting attorney fees and costs, be remitted to the state treasurer for deposit into the
general fund. There is no express language that defines when the State acquires its
interest in a punitive damages judgment. Yet, the trial court determined that the statute
clearly states that the State is given an interest in the judgment "when and i f the
judgment is paid.
The trial court based its interpretation on the word "paid", isolating it from
the rest of the sentence where that word is found. The trial court did not harmonize the
statute in question with other provisions of the Punitive Damage Awards Act, namely
Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1.5(2002) where the court is required to notify the State of a
punitive damage award at the time it is made and the caption where reference is made to
"division" with the state. In addition, the trial court did not liberally construe the statute
to meet the legislative purpose.
Because punitive damages are generally not awarded to compensate the
plaintiff, they are not given as the plaintiffs due, as a matter of right, or as an entitlement.
Punitive damages are allowed only where expressly authorized by statute. The
Legislature has conditioned the recovery of punitive damages by requiring that in any
judgment where punitive damages are awarded, 50% of the amount of punitive damages
shall, after payment of attorneys fees and costs, be paid to the State.
Since the Punitive Damage Awards Act was enacted before the judgment in
this case, the Smiths did not have vested in them the right to recover the entire punitive
damages award. This includes any interest that accrued on the State's portion of the
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judgment. As a result, Utah Code Ann. §78-18-1(3) (as originally enacted in 1989) does
not operate as a taking of the Smiths' property in violation of the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions.
ARGUMENT
A.

BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED LONG-STANDING RULES
OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, IT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS ACT IS INCORRECT.
1.

There are rules of statutory construction that aid the court in

construing statutes. The appellate courts have explained that the aim of the court should
be to give effect to the legislature's intent in light of the purpose that the statute was
meant to achieve. In Re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074 at 1079; Brixen
& Christopher Arch, v. State, 2001 UT App 210, 29 P.3d 650, 655. To determine that
intent, the court looks first to the plain language of the statute. Strawberry Elec. v.
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870, 875 (Utah 1996). When the statutory language is plain
and unambiguous, the court does not look beyond the language's plain meaning to divine
legislative intent. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650 at 655 (quoting State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App
379, Tf 5, 18 P.3d 504). The meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but
must be drawn from the context in which it is used. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650 at 655 (quoting
State v. In, 2000 UT App 358, % 5, 18 P.3d 500). Accordingly, the court interprets the
terms of a statute as a comprehensive whole and not in piecemeal fashion. Brixen, 29
P.3d 650 at 655 (quoting Hercules, Inc. v. Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372,122, 21 P.3d
231). In doing so, the court must give meaning, where possible, to all provisions of a
statute. Brixen, 29 P.3d 650 at 655 (quoting Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, f 23, 11 P.3d
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277). When doubt or uncertainty exists as to the meaning or application of an act's
provisions, an analysis of the act in its entirety should be undertaken and its provisions
harmonized in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. In Re Marriage of
Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 at 1079.
One of the cardinal principles of statutory construction is that the courts will
look to the reason, spirit, and sense of the legislation, as indicated by the entire context
and subject matter of the statute dealing with the subject. In Re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1
P.3d 1074 at 1079. Moreover, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and
the court has no power to rewrite the statute to conform with an intention not expressed.
Brixen, 29 P.3d 650 at 655 (quoting State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ 14, 2 P.3d
954). Further, the court has a duty to construe a statute whenever possible so as to
effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or save it from constitutional conflicts or
infirmities. In Re Marriage of Gonzalez, 1 P.3d 1074 at 1079. If the court finds the
provisions of the statute to be ambiguous, it will seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations. Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d
85 at 90 (quoting State v. Ostler, 2001 UT 68,1f 7, 31 P.3d 528); Strawberry Elec. v.
Spanish Fork City, 918 P.2d 870 (Utah 1996)(quoting World Peace Movement v.
Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253 (Utah 1994)).
2.

Utah Code Ann.§78-18-1(3) fas originally enacted in 1989) plainly

states that in any judgment where punitive damages are awarded and paid, 50% of the
amount of punitive damages shall, after deducting attorney fees and costs, be remitted to
the state treasurer for deposit into the general fiind. Until the statute was amended in

TO

2004, there was no language in the statute that stated who is to pay the State's portion to
the state treasurer nor was there any language that stated how the State would collect its
portion of the punitive damages in the event that the state treasurer did not receive
payment as required by the statute. Moreover, the statute has no express language that
states when the State acquires its interest in the judgment. Yet in spite of this, the trial
court determined that the statute clearly provides for the State's interest in the Judgment
to trigger when and if the punitive damages judgment is "paid" to the payee, the judgment
creditor or the Smiths in this case.
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court focused on the word "paid" in
isolation and without regard to the rest of the sentence in which it is used. Instead of
reading this word as part of the sentence that requires the State's portion of the punitive
damage judgment to be remitted to the state treasurer at the time of payment, the court
interpreted the word "paid" as defining when the State acquired its interest in the
judgment. The trial court stated that it could not read words into the statute, then did just
that when it ruled that the State's interest in the judgment triggered "when and i f
payment were made. The trial court essentially rewrote the statute to fit its construction
without giving any regard to the Legislature's purpose in enacting the statute. That
purpose should have been part of the trial court's analysis.
To find the legislative purpose, the trial court should have analyzed Utah
Code Ann.§78-18-1(3) (as originally enacted in 1989) with other provisions of the statute.
Utah Code Ann.§78-18-1.5(2002) was added to require the clerk of the court to
"immediately notify the attorney general and state treasurer of the verdict, finding or
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order" and to "notify the attorney general and the state treasurer within five days after
entry of a judgment award of punitive damages." The notice is to include the name of the
party and his attorney, against whom the judgment was ordered; the amount of the
judgment; and the date on which the judgment was entered.
Why would the Legislature require that notice be given to the State
"immediately" after a punitive damage award is made and "within five days of entry of a
judgment" if it did not intend for the division of the punitive damages award to occur at
the time of judgment? Why would the notice requirement include the name of the
judgment debtor, the amount of the judgment and the date of the judgment? The only
reasonable answer to both questions is that the Legislature intended for the division of the
punitive damages to occur at the time the judgment is entered. There is no trigger of the
State's interest "when and i f the judgment is paid as the trial court concluded.
There is an additional provision that was ignored by the trial court. The
caption to the Punitive Damage Awards Act clearly identifies one of the purposes of the
Act as being the "Division of award with state." There is no reference to "payment to the
state." The only reasonable interpretation is that the legislature intended that when
punitive damages are awarded in a judgment, those damages are to be divided with the
State. With this as the clear legislative purpose, it is more logical to infer that the
legislature intended for the division to occur on the date of the judgment rather than on
the date that the judgment is paid to the plaintiff as the trial court concluded. Further, this
must be the statute's construction if it is to be liberally construed to give effect to the
legislative purpose and to avoid conflids with the constitution.

3.

Even if more than one reading of the language of the statute could be

made, the legislative history clearly fixes one of the purposes of the Punitive Damage
Awards Act as requiring that any punitive damages awarded in a case be divided with the
State at the time the award is made. In the floor debates that took place when the statute
was originally enacted in 1989, Senator Barlow, the sponsor of the original Bill,
repeatedly explained that the purpose of the statute is to "divide" the punitive damage
award between the plaintiff and the State. According to Senator Barlow, this was agreed
to by the interim committee that recommended the Bill because of the "criminal nature"
of punitive damages awards. Floor Debate, debate of S.B.24, 48th Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 1
and 2, 1989)(Sen. Recording Nos. 43 and 45).
In addition, the amendments that the Legislature made to the Punitive
Damage Awards Act in 2004 clarify that it was the Legislature's intent to divide the
punitive damages at the time that the award is made and not at the time that the judgment
is paid as the trial court concluded. These amendments became effective May 3, 2004.
They changed the original language of Utah Code Ann.§78-18-1(3) to state that "[i]n any
case where punitive damages are awarded, the judgment shall provide that 50% of the
amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after an allowable deduction
for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted by the judgment debtor to the
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund." In addition, subparagraphs (c) and (d)
were added. Subparagraph (c) states that "[t]he state shall have all rights due a judgment
creditor until the judgment is satisfied, and stand on equal footing with the judgment
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creditor of the original case in securing a recovery." Subparagraph (d) was added to set
forth the priority of how recovered money is to be applied to the judgment.
These amendments do not change the substance of the statute, which is that
when punitive damages are awarded, they are still divided in half with the State after
deducting attorneys' fees and costs. The amendments simply clarify the process in
»

carrying out how the State's share is to be paid. See comments made by Senator Hillyard
when S.B. 201 was presented for vote, 55 Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 27, 2004, p.m. session)
(Sen. Recording Tape 44).
Amendments to statutes are generally presumed to indicate a legislative
intent to change existing legal rights and therefore are not a reliable indication of intent as
to the earlier, unamended statute. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, 66 P.3d 592, 599.
However, the presumption that the amendment is intended to change existing legal rights
and liabilities is rebuttable. Wilde v. Wilde, 2001 UT App 318, 35 P.3d 341,345 (citing
Abel v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah Ct.App.1993)..
Because the 2004 amendments are procedural and remedial in nature, the
amendments do not change the legal rights of the Smiths or the State. Therefore, they
provide a clear indication that the Legislature originally intended that the punitive
damages judgment be divided with the State at the time that the judgment is entered and
not when it was paid to the Smiths as the trial court concluded,
B.

BECAUSE THE RIGHT TO RECOVER THE ENTIRE PUNITIVE
DAMAGES JUDGMENT DID NOT VEST IN THE SMITHS, THERE IS
NO TAKING OF THEIR PROPERTY IN VIOLATION OF THE
TAKINGS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
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The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the taking
of private property for public use without just compensation. The Utah Constitution
Article I, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution includes the same prohibition, although
more expansive. A "takings" analysis under Article I, Section 22 has two principle steps.
First, the claimant must demonstrate some protected interest in property. If the claimant
possesses a protectable interest in property, the claimant must then show that the interest
has been "taken or damaged" by government action. Strawberry Elec. v. Spanish Fork
City. 918 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1996).
The kinds of property subject to being protected are practically unlimited.
Article I, Section 22 protects all property protected by the Fifth Amendment and perhaps
more due to its more expansive language. Under Article I, Section 22, property that is
subject to protection includes every species of property which the public needs may
require, including legal and equitable rights of every description. Strawberry Elec. 918
P.2d 870 at 877. Given this understanding of the broad range of property interests that
are protected, the rights that one acquires in a judgment certainly are protected under the
Utah and U.S. Constitutions.
In the present case, the Smiths did not acquire a protectable interest in
punitive damages until the trial court entered its judgment on June 29,200 L The interest
that the Smiths acquired was 50% of the punitive damages judgment pursuant to Utah
Code Ann.§78-18-l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989). They did not acquire an interest in
the entire punitive damages judgment.

The legislature does nol have the power to take away rights which have
been once vested by a judgment. 46 Am. Jur.2d Judgments ^ 13 at 380 (1994). However,
because punitive damages are generally not awarded to compensate the plaintiff, they are
not given as the plaintiffs due, as a matter of right, or as an entitlement. 22 Am. Jur. 2d
Damages f546 at 484 (2003). This rule is explained by the fact that there is no cause of
action for punitive damages. Punitive damages are an additional remedy that may be
awarded in the appropriate case. DeBry v. Cascade Enterprises, 879 P.2d 1353, 1359
(Utah 1994). Punitive damages are part of the common law, which the legislature has a
right to modify. Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18, 70 P.3d 78. Indeed, this court has
recently ruled in a case dealing with the dramshop act that punitive damages are allowed
only where expressly authorized by statute. Adkins v. Uncle Bart's, 2000 UT 14, 1 P.3d
528, 537.
As a result, the Smiths5 ability to recover punitive damages was conditioned
by the provisions of the Punitive Damage Awards Act. Because Utah Code Ann.§78-18l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989) was in effect before the judgment was entered in this
case, the Smiths never had a vested right to recover the State's half of the punitive
damages judgment. Because they do not have a property right to that portion of the
judgment, there is no taking of their property in violation of the Utah and U.S.
Constitutions.
C.

THE DIVISION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENT DOES NOT
VIOLATE OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
The Smiths argued to the trial court that in addition to Utah Code Ann.§78-

18-l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989) resulting in an unconstitutional taking, the statute

violated other constitutional provisions, namely the separation of powers, equal
protection, prohibition against excessive fines, the right to jury trial and due process.
Because of the way that the trial court ruled, it did not rule on these issues.
These issues also evaporate once Utah Code Ann.§78-18-l(3)(as originally
enacted in 1989) is construed to not vest in the Smiths the right to recover the entire
punitive damages judgment. As shown above, the Legislature is clearly within its
authority to define when punitive damages are to be allowed. Once the punitive damages
were defined by statute, that is the sum that the Smiths or others similarly situated could
expect to recover under any judgment where punitive damages are awarded. The trial
court's judgment is not interfered with. There is nothing taken from the Smiths that could
be construed as a fine. Finally, the Smiths had their right to due process and a jury trial
where they were awarded a judgment that fully compensated them for their injuries.
D.

THE LEGISLATURE REVIEWED THE NEED FOR TORT REFORM
AND THE GENERAL CONCERN OVER THE FAIRNESS OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND DETERMINED THAT PUNITIVE
DAMAGES SHOULD BE DIVIDED WITH THE STATE.
L

By enacting the Punitive Damage Awards Act, the Legislature

determined that it should be the public policy to limit the plaintiffs recovery of punitive
damages. During the 1980s, punitive damage awards received much criticism and debate.
With punitive damage awards increasing in number and size, the perception was that
punitive damages awards were simply a windfall for greedy plaintiffs that were getting
increasingly out of control. Notes, A Shift in the Windfall: An Analysis of Indiana's
Punitive Damages Allocation Statute and the Recovery of Attorney's Fees Under the
Particular Services Clause. 32 Valparaiso University L. Rev. 924, 925 (1998); Kirgis,
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The Constitutionality of State Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards, 50 Wash, and Lee
L. Rev. 843 (1993); and Benjamin F. Evans, "Split-Recovery" Survives: The Missouri
Supreme Court Upholds the State's Power to Collect One-Half of Punitive Damages
Awards, 63 Missouri L. Rev. 511, 516 (1998).
In response to that criticism, some states enacted laws that put caps on the
amount of punitive damages that can be awarded. Other states abolished punitive
damages altogether. However, these approaches were seen to either weaken or take away
altogether the purpose behind punitive damages which is to punish and deter bad
behavior. The Utah Legislature enacted the Punitive Damages Awards Act as a
compromise between these two opposing views. Floor Debate, remarks by Senator
Barlow, 48th Leg. Gen. Sess. (Feb. 1, 1989)(Sen. Recording No. 43).
Besides Utah, there were eleven other states that similarly enacted these so
called "split-recovery statutes" as their answer to the public's call for tort reform..1 Eight
of those states have had constitutional challenges to their statutory schemes. Seven of the
eight upheld their states split-recovery statute as being constitutional. Anderson v. State
of Alaska ex rel. Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Association. 78 P.3d 710 (Alaska
2003); Gordon v. State. 608 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1992); State v. Moselev. 436 S.E.2d 632
(Georgia 1993): Cheatham v. PohL 789 N.E.2d 467 (Indiana 2003); Shepherd
Components. Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue and Associates. Inc.. 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa
1991); Fust v. Attorney General for the State of Missouri. 947 S.W.2d 423 (Missouri
1997); and DeMendoza v. Huffman. 51 P.3d 1232 (Ore. 2002).

1

See appendix for texts of the other states' statutes.

Colorado is the only one whose state supreme court determined its splitrecovery statute to be unconstitutional. Kirk v. Denver Publishing Company, 818 P.2d
262 (Colo. 1991). The Colorado statute, unlike the statutes of Utah and the other states,
expressly stated that "nothing [in the Colorado statute] shall be construed to give the
general fund any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or in the regulation itself at
any time prior to payment becoming due."
2.

The Legislature has the role of determining the fairness of limiting

the recovery of punitive damages by plaintiffs and not the Court. To many, especially to
plaintiffs like the Smiths, the effect of the Punitive Damage Awards Act seems unfair
when it is the plaintiffs who have the right to bring the underlying cause of action that
gives rise to a remedy of punitive damages and who carry the burden of establishing the
right to recover punitive damages in that action. The Smiths argued that the trial court
should consider the fairness of the statute in reaching its decision. That, however, is not
the court's role. See Hukkanen-Campbell v.Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service,
274 F.3d 1321 (10th Cir. 2001) cert, denied, 535 U.S. 1056 (2002) where the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals rejected the taxpayer's invitation to correct the perceived inequities of
the Tax Code, leaving that role to Congress. The Legislature debated the merits of
allowing the recovery by plaintiffs of punitive damages and decided to allow them to be
recovered after dividing them in half with the State.
E.

THE STATE IS ENTITLED TO THE POST JUDGMENT INTEREST
PAID ON ITS PORTION OF THE PUNITIVE DAMAGES JUDGMENT.
If the Smiths did not receive the right to recover the entire punitive damages

judgment because it was divided with the State, then they do not have the right to claim
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the interest that accrued on that portion of the judgment that belongs to the State.
Because the Smiths do not have a property right to the interest that has accrued on the
State's portion of the punitive damages judgment, there is no taking of their property.
F.

THE STATE'S PORTION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IS SUBJECT TO
A PORTION OF THE SMITHS' REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES
AND COSTS.
The Punitive Damage Awards Act provides that 50% of the punitive

damages judgment should be paid to the State after deducting attorneys' fees and costs.
As explained above, the statute was amended to define the attorneys' fees and costs as
"the amount of actual and reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the judgment
creditor, minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding attorneys1 fees and costs to
the judgment creditor." This definition of attorneys' fees and costs to be deducted is
applicable to this case.
CONCLUSION
The court must reverse the decision of the trial court and rule that Utah
Code Ann. §78-18-l(3)(as originally enacted in 1989) is constitutional and enforceable
against the Smiths.
DATED this I J ^ d a y of November, 2004.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

KEVINV. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Rule 19 Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDUM 1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ARMAND L. SMITH, individually
and as Trustee for the Armand L.
Smith, Jr., and Shannon S.
Windham Trusts, and VIRGINIA L.
SMITH, individually,
Plaintiffs,

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER
DECLARING THE 1989 UTAH
PUNITIVE DAMAGE STATUTE,
UTAH CODE ANN. §78-18-1(3)
(1989), UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
UNENFORCEABLE AND VOID
AS AGAINST THE SMITHS
CASE NO,

vs

940904312

PRICE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a
Utah corporation, nka FAIRFAX
REALTY, INC., NORTH PLAINS LAND
COMPANY, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership, and NORTH PLAINS
DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership,
Defendants.
The State Treasurer, Edward T.
Alter of the State of Utah, for
and in behalf of THE STATE OF
UTAH,
Additional Rule 19
Defendant.
Plaintiffs1, Armand L. Smith and Virginia L. Smith and the
Smith Trusts ("Smiths"), Motion for Summary Judgment against the
State of Utah, declaring Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3)

(1989),

unconstitutional and unenforceable in this case, having come on for
hearing before the Court, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, District
Judge presiding, on Friday, June

11, 2004,

at

9:00

a.m.,

the

plaintiffs being represented by their counsel, Robert S. Campbell

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.

PAGE 2

and Jennifer Anderson Whitlock

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

of VanCott, Bagley,

Cornwall

&

McCarthy, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the Utah State Treasurer for
and in behalf of the State of Utah, appearing through his and its
counsel, Kevin Olsen, Utah Assistant Attorney General, and the
Court having heard and received oral argument on the Smiths1 Motion
for Summary Judgment as to the unconstitutionality of Utah Code
Ann.,

§ 78-18-1(3)

(1989),

and alternatively,

the Motion

with

respect to interest on the Judgment and attorney's fees applicable
under the statute, if upheld;
And the Court having considered said arguments, as well as the
briefs submitted by the Smiths and the Utah Attorney General on
said issues; and being now apprised as to all and singular the
issues in the case and having determined that Summary Judgment
should

be

entered

in

favor

of

unconstitutionality of § 78-18-1(3)

the

Smiths

as

to

the

(1989);

NOW, THEREFORE, good cause appearing, the Court hereby enters
the following Order and supporting Opinion and Conclusions:
OPINION AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

There are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute

and Summary Judgment procedure, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c) is proper.
2.

That the Smiths' Motion for Summary Judgment as to the

unconstitutionality of Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3)

(1989),

is

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.

PAGE 3

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

premised upon several bases, viz., that the statute constitutes an
unconstitutional taking of the Smiths' vested property rights in
the Courts' Judgment of June 29, 2001, in violation of the Fifth
Amendment

made applicable

to the State through

the

Fourteenth

Amendment of the United States Constitution and Art. I, Sec. 22 of
the Utah Constitution, that the statute violates the Separation of
Powers Article, Art. V, Sec. 1, and Art. VIII, Sec. 7, of the Utah
Constitution, that the statute violates the Smiths1 guarantees to
Equal Protection of the Law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United

States

Constitution

and

Art.

I,

Sec.

24

of

the

Utah

Constitution, as well as the governing case precedent.
3-

That the State Treasurer, in behalf of the State of Utah,

has opposed the Smiths1 Motion for Summary Judgment and declaratory
Judgment on each of said constitutional grounds and has asserted
the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3) (1989).
4.

That the statute, § 78-18-1(3)

(1989), as enacted in

1989, on its face clearly does not give the State Treasurer or the
State of Utah any interest in the Judgment ot this Court when first
issued, nor does it give the State any interest in the underlying
cause of action.

The State's interest is triggered when and if the

punitive damage Judgment is "paid" to the payee, Judgment creditor
in this case, the Smiths.

To do as the State suggests, and rule

that the statute gives the State an interest in the Judgment when

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

first issued, would require this Court to read something into the
statute that simply is not there.

This the Couirt is unwilling to

do.
5.

That

the

Smiths'

property

interests

in

the

entire

Judgment which are entitled to constitutional protection, vested in
the Judgment as of the date of its entry on June 29, 2 0 01.
6.

That Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as enacted in 1989,

constitutes a "taking" by the State of Utah of the Smiths' vested
property

interests

in

the

Judgment

of

this

Court,

which

is

prohibited by the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution
made applicable to the State through the Fourteenth Amendment, as
well as Art. I, Sec. 22 of the Utah Constitution.

After having

reached this conclusion, however, this Court makes no determination
as to the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3), as
amended by the 2 0 04 Legislature.
7.

In arriving at this determination of constitutionality,

the Court bases its ruling on the "taking" clauses of the federal
and state Constitutions only, and does not pass upon the Separation
of

Powers or Equal

Protection

Clause

of the

state

or

federal

constitutions.
8.
and

The Summary Judgment Motion of Smiths should be granted

Smiths

are

entitled

Judgment, together with

to payment
interest

of

the

$2,740,000

on the Judgment

of

the

of $560,020,

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.
together
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with accruing

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

interest under the present

depository

agreement in the Utah Public Treasurer's Investment Fund.
ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the
Smiths' Motion for Summary Judgment against the State Treasurer in
behalf of the State of Utah, be and the same is hereby granted, and
the Utah statute, Utah Code Ann., § 78-18-1(3) (1989), as enacted
in 1989, be and the same is hereby declared unconstitutional,
unenforceable, and void.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that all monies
presently being held on deposit with the Utah Public Treasurer's
Investment Fund shall remain in such Fund, or in such other fund as
the parties may agree, while the State Treasurer considers whether
to file an appeal in this matter.

If this matter is not appealed

within thirty (3 0) days of the date of this Order, the funds shall
be paid to the plaintiffs within two (2) days after the expiration
of said appeal period.

In the event of an appeal, the funds shall

remain on deposit with the Utah Public Treasurer's Investment Fund,
or in such other fund as the parties may agree in writing to obtain
a higher rate of interest pending resolution of the appeal, and all
subject to further Order of the Court.

Upon resolution of the

appeal, the monies shall be immediately payable to plaintiffs or
the State Treasurer according to the ruling of the appellate court.

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT ORDER

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that each party shall bear their own
respective costs in connection with this Motion and Order.
Dated this ^ w M a y of June, 2004.

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

SMITH V. PRICE
DEVELOPMENT CO.
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Summary Judgment Order Declaring the 198 9 Utah Punitive
Damage

Statute,

Utah

Code

Ann.,

§

78-18-1(3)

(1989)

Unconstitutional, Unenforceable and Void as Against the Smiths, to
the following, this,

day of June, 2 004:

Robert S. Campbell
Jennifer Anderson Whitlock
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
50 S. Main Street, Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Harold G. Christensen
Reed L. Martineau
Rex E. Madsen
Attorney for Defendant Price Development
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000
James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Attorney for Defendant Price Development
36 S. State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Kevin Olsen
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Utah State Treasurer
160 East 300 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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ADDENDUM 2

1

defended themselves, their position because there hadn't been a

2 | payment by the defendant to the plaintiff and we submit that in
I
3

any event the interest, Your Honor, on the judgment, should be
i

4 | set over and paid to my clients.
5

t

They're going to probably

have to pay tax on that as well and they are entitled to it

6 ' regardless of how the Court rules.

If the Court finds the

i

!

7

statute to be unconstitutional as we say it is, then the issue

8 | on the interest is moot.

It's only relevant if the Court were

9 i to uphold the constitutionality of the statute.
10 j

On attorney's fees, I think we're in agreement on

11 I that issue, Your Honor.

Thank you very much.

If the Court has

12 i not further questions, we'd submit it.
13 |

THE COURT:

I don't.

14

MR. CAMPBELL:

Thank you.

Thank you.

15
THE COURT: Gentlemen, your briefs and your arguments
16 | have been very helpful to the Court. You've been very thorough
j

17 ' and very helpful.

It occurs to the Court that the statute on

!

18 ' its face at least is quite clear to the Court that it gives no
i

19

interest to the State in the judgment when it's issued or in a

20 , cause of action and that the State's interest is triggered by
21

the payment of the judgment.

22

Now, for this Court to rule that somehow the State
!

23
24
25

did have an interest in the judgment is going to require the
l

Court to read something into that judgment that is not there
and the Court is not willing to do that.

Now where does that
44

leave us?

I think that leads us to Mr. Smith's argument and

that is that under the structure of this statute, it is indeed
a taking of a portion of Mr. Smith's judgment by the state of
Utah which is prohibited by the Utah State Constitution and by
the U. S. Constitution and therefore the Court is going to
grant the Motion for Summary Judgment.
I'm not going to rule - having ruled as I have, I'm
not going to rule on the separation of powers or the equal
protection clauses of the constitution and so that in a
nutshell is the Court's ruling without going into a lot of
detail and I'll order that the amount with interest that's now
being held by the State be paid to Mr. Smith or to the
plaintiff in this case.
How soon can that be done?
MR. OLSEN:

As far as payment, Your Honor?

THE COURT:

Yes.

MR. OLSEN:

That can be done as

orders it.

soon as the Court

There shouldn't be any problem.

I do want to talk

with Mr. Campbell after because we likely will appeal the
Court's ruling and we'd like to have some way of - that's
something we can talk about after but we can do as the Court
orders.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I want to make it clear, I'm

making no ruling on the current statute and whether split
recovery statutes in general are unconstitutional.

That is not

45
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L a w s of U t a h - 1989
CHAPTER 237
S. B. No. 24
Passed February 21, 1989
Approved March 14, 1989
Effective May 1, 1989

L/iu
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awarded and paid, 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall, after payment of attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the
state treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
S e c t i o n 2. S e c t i o n E n a c t e d .
Section 7 8 - 1 8 - 2 , U t a h Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:
78-18-2. D r u g e x c e p t i o n .
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a
drug causing the claimant's harm: (a) received premarket approval or licensure by the Federal Food
and Drug Administration under the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 301 et.
seq. or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 201 et. seq.;
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective
under conditions established by the Federal Food
and Drug Administration and applicable regulations, including packaging and labeling regulations.
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive damages does not apply if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence t h a t the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented information required to be submitted to the Federal Food and Drug
Administration under its regulations, which information was material and relevant to the claimant's
harm.
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AN ACT RELATING TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES; PROVIDING CERTAIN STANDARDS
FOR AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES.

S e c t i o n 3. S e v e r a b i l i t y Clause.

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

If any provision of this act, or the application of
any provision to any person or circumstance, is held
invalid, the remainder of this act is given effect
without the invalid provision or application.

ENACTS:
7 8 - 1 8 - 1 , UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
78-18-2, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n E n a c t e d .
Section 7 8 - 1 8 - 1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, is
enacted to read:
78-18-1. B a s i s for p u n i t i v e d a m a g e s a w a r d s
— S e c t i o n inapplicable to DUI c a s e s — Div i s i o n of a w a r d w i t h state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute,
punitive damages may be awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is established by clear and convincing evidence t h a t the
acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct t h a t manifests a knowing and
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, the
rights of others.

S e c t i o n 4. Effective Date.
This act takes effect on May 1,1989, and applies to
all claims for punitive damages t h a t arise on or after
t h a t date.

(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and
standards of conduct of Subsection (a) do not apply
to any claim for punitive damages arising out of the
tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of any
drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section 41—6-44.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3) In any judgment where punitive damages are
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ADDENDUM 4

CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Section
78-18-1.

Basis for punitive damages awards—Section inapplicable to DUI cases—
Division of award with state.
78-18-1.5. Punitive damages—Notification procedure.
78-18-2.
Drug exception.
§ 78—18—1. Basis for punitive damages awards—Section inapplicable to
DUI cases—Division of award with state
(l)(a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive damages may be
awarded only if compensatory or general damages are awarded and it is
established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the
tortfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless indifference toward,
and a disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and standards of conduct of
Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out
of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntarily
intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or combination of alcohol and
drugs as prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding
shoplifting is not subject to the prior award of compensatory or general
damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section 78-11-15 or
78-11-16.
(2) Evidence of a party's wealth or financial condition shall be admissible
only after a finding of liability for punitive damages has been made.
(3)(a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded, the judgment shall
provide that 50% of the amount of the punitive damages in excess of $20,000
shall, after an allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs,
be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state treasurer for deposit into the
General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an "allowable deduction for the
payment of attorneys' fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the judgment creditor minus
the amount of any separate judgment awarding attorneys' fees and costs to
the judgment creditor.
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until the
judgment is satisfied, and stand on equal footing with the judgment creditor
of the original case in securing a recovery.
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state, expressly agree otherwise or the application is contrary to the terms of the judgment, any payment
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on the judgment by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntai \
or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the following ordci
(1) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs
(n) the initial $20,000 punitive damages, and finally
(in) the balance of the punitive damages
Laws 1989, c 237, 3 1, Laws 1991, c 6, § 4, Laws 2002, c 200, § 15, eff July 1, 2002
Laws 2002, c 314, § 1, eff May 6, 2002, Laws 2004, c 164, § 1, eff May 3, 2004
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Laws 2002, c 200, inserted ' or motorboat" in
Laws 2004, c 164, m subsec (3)(a), channel
subsec (l)(b)
'judgment" to ' case', changed "awarded and
Laws 2002, c 314, inserted in subsec (3)(a) paid," to ' awarded, the judgment shall providi
"an allowable deduction for the and added that" and inserted "by the judgment debtoi
subsec (3)(b)
and added subsecs (3)(c) and (d)
Composite section by the Office of Legislative
Research and General Counsel of Laws 2002, c
200, § 15 and Laws 2002, c 314, ^ 1
Cross References
Costs awarded upon judgment, see Rules Civ Proc , Rule 54
Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Barrett, Punitive Damages A Primer for Toward a Sounder Law of Punitive Damage^
Utah, Crookston v Fire Insurance Exchange, 6
1993 Utah L Rev 513(1993)
BYUJ Pub L 575(1992)
Zwier, Due Piocess and Punitive Damages
Black, Punitive Damages in Utah, 1 Utah B J
1991 UtahL Rev 407(1991)
11 (Nov 1988)
Johnson, Crookston v Fire Insurance Exchange and the Utah Punitive Damages Act

Automobiles @=»249
Damages <s=>87 to 94, 181
Westlaw Key Number Searches
115k94, 115kl81, 48Ak249

Library References
C J S Damages §§ 183, 195 to 217, 265
C J S Motor Vehicles § 1283
115k87 to

Research References
ALR Library
Treatises and Practice Aids
Accountant's Liability § 5 4 5, Punitive Dam
33 A L R 5th 303, Intoxication of Automobile
ages
Driver as Basis for Awarding Punitive DamAccountant's Liability § 7 2 3, Damages Re
ages
suiting from Breach
58 A L R 4 t h 878, Standard of Proof as to
American Law of Products Liability 3d PS
Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage
Primary Sources
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ADDENDUM 5

CHAPTER 314
S. B. 141
Passed March 6, 2002
Approved March 26, 2002
Effective May 6, 2002
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard
This act modifies the Judicial Code,
specifically clarifying that the state
treasurer and attorney general shall be
notified of a jury verdict or judge's order
awarding punitive damages and again when
judgment is entered awarding punitive
damages. The act also clarifies that a
reduction for attorneys' fees and costs shall
be offset by any court award of attorneys'
fees and costs, and based on fees and costs
that are actual and reasonable.
This act affects sections of Utah Code Annotated
1953 as follows:
AMENDS:
78-18-1, as last amended by Chapter 6, Laws of
Utah 1991

an allowable deduction for the payment of
attorneys' fees and costs, be remitted to the state
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund.
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3), an
"allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys'
fees and costs" shall equal the amount of actual and
reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by the
judgment creditor, minus the anfount of any
separate judgment awarding attorneys' fees and
costs to the judgment creditor.
Section 2. Section 78-18-1.5 is enacted to
read:
78-18-1.5. Punitive damages — Notification
procedure.
(1) Whenever it appears from a return of a jury
verdict in any court jury trial or from entry of a
finding or order in any court bench trial, that
punitive damages have been awarded to the
plaintiff in a court action, the clerk of the court shall
immediately notify the attorney general and state
treasurer of the verdict, finding, or order. The
notice shall contain:
(a) the names of both parties to the action, and
their attorneys;

ENACTS:
78-18-1.5, Utah Code Annotated 1953

(b) the case number; and

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

(c) the location of the court.

Section 1. Section 78-18-1 is amended to
read:
78-18-1. Basis for punitive damages awards
— Section inapplicable to DUI cases —
Division of award with state.
(1) (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute,
punitive damages may be awarded only if
compensatory or general damages are awarded and
it is established by clear and convincing evidence
that the acts or omissions of the tortfeasor are the
result of willful and malicious or intentionally
fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a
disregard of, the rights of others.
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and
standards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not
apply to any claim for punitive damages arising out
of the tortfeasor's operation of a motor vehicle while
voluntarily intoxicated or under the influence of
any drug or combination of alcohol and drugs as
prohibited by Section 41-6-44.
(c) The award of a penalty under Section
78-11-15 or 78-11-16 regarding shoplifting is not
subject to the prior award of compensatory or
general damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether
or not restitution has been paid to the merchant
prior to or as a part of a civil action under Section

(2) In addition to the notice required in
Subsection (1) of this section, the clerk of the court
shall notify the attorney general and the state
treasurer within five days after entry of a judgment
award of punitive damages. The notice shall
contain:
(a) the name of the party and his attorney, against
whom the judgment was ordered;
(b) the amount of the judgment; and
(c) the date on which the judgment was entered.

ADDENDUM 6

INO Doimer snail, in time ot peace, be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable s e a r c h e s and seizures,]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions c o n c e r n i n g — D u e process of l a w and j u s t c o m p e n s a t i o n clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.
AMENDMENT VI
[Rights of accused.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor,
and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence.
AMENDMENT VII
[Trial b y j u r y in civil cases.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by j u r y shall be

ADDENDUM 7

Sec, 17. [Elections to be free — Soldiers voting.]
All elections shall be free, and no power, civil or military,
shall at any time interfere to prevent the free exercise of the
right of suffrage. Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their
post of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations to be
prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 18.

[Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing
contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed.
1896
Sec. 19. [Treason defined — Proof.]
Treason against the State shall consist only in levying war
against it, or in adhering to its enemies or in giving them aid
and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on
the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act.
1896
Sec. 20. [Military subordinate to the civil power.]
The military shall be in strict subordination to the civil
power, and no soldier in time of peace, shall be quartered in
any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war
except in a manner to be prescribed by law.
1896
Sec. 21. [Slavery forbidden.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within this State.
1896
Sec. 22. [Private property for public use.]
Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public
use without just compensation.
1896
Sec. 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.]
No law shall be passed granting irrevocably any franchise,
privilege or immunity.
1896
Sec. 24. [Uniform operation of laws.]
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
1896

Sec. 25. [Rights retained by people.]
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair
or deny others retained by the people.
1896
Sec. 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.]
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and

ADDENDUM 8

TEXTS OF OTHER "SPLIT-RECOVERY" STATUTES

Alaska
Alaska Stat. § 09.17.020(j). "If a person receives an award of punitive damages, the court
shall require that 50 percent of the award be deposited into the general fond of the state.
This subsection does not grant the state the right to file or join a civil action to recover
punitive damages."
Colorado
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-12-102(4). (repealed effective March 9, 1995) "One-third of
all reasonable damages collected pursuant to this section shall be paid into the state
general fond. The remaining two-thirds of such damages collected shall be paid to the
injured party. Nothing in this subsection (4) shall be construed to give the general fond
any interest in the claim for exemplary damages or in the litigation itself at any time prior
to payment becoming due."
Florida
Florida Stat. § 768-73(2)(b). (repealed effective July 1, 1997) "If the cause of action was
based on personal injury or wrongful death, 60 percent of the award shall be payable to
the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund created in s.409.2662; otherwise, 60 percent of
the award shall be payable to the General Revenue Fund."
Georgia
Ga. Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(e) (2002). "(e)(1) In a tort case in which the cause of action
arises from product liability, there shall be no limitation regarding the amount which may
be awarded as punitive damages. Only one award of punitive damages may be recovered
in a court in this state from a defendant for any act or omission if the cause of action
arises from product liability, regardless of the number of causes of action which may arise
from such act or omission.
(2) Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this subsection as punitive
damages, less a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable
attorneys fees, all as determined by the trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of the
state through the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services. Upon issuance of judgment in
such a case, the state shall have all rights due a judgment creditor until such judgment is
satisfied and shall stand on equal footing with the plaintiff of the original case in securing
a recovery after payment to the plaintiff of damages awarded other than as punitive
damages. A judgment debtor may remit the state's proportional share of punitive damages
to the clerk of the court in which the judgment was rendered. It shall be the duty of the
clerk to pay over such amounts to the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services within 60
days of receipt from the judgment debtor. This paragraph shall not be construed as
1

making the state a party at interest and the sole right of the state is to the proceeds as
provided in this paragraph."
Illinois
735 111. Comp. Stat. 5/2-1207 (2004) "Punitive damages. The trial court may, in its
discretion, with respect to punitive damages, determine whether a jury award for punitive
damages is excessive, and if so, enter a remittitur and a conditional new trial. The trial
court may also in its discretion, apportion the punitive damage award among the plaintiff,
the plaintiffs attorney and the State of Illinois Department of Human Services. The
amount of the award paid from the punitive damages to the plaintiffs attorney shall be
reasonable and without regard to any contingent fee contract, except that such amount
shall not exceed the amount authorized by the contingent fee contract. In apportioning
punitive damages as provided in this Section, the court shall consider, among other
factors it deems relevant, whether any special duty was owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff."
Indiana
Ind. Code §34-51-3-6 (1999).
"(a) Except as provided in IC 13-25-4-10, when a judgment that includes a punitive
damage award is entered in a civil action, the party against whom the judgment was
entered shall pay the punitive damage award to the clerk of the court where the action is
pending.
(b) Upon receiving the payment described in subsection (a), the clerk of the court shall:
(1) pay the person to whom punitive damages were awarded twenty-five percent (25%) of
the punitive damage award; and
(2) pay the remaining seventy-five percent (75%) of the punitive damage award to the
treasurer of state, who shall deposit the funds into the violent crime victims compensation
fund established in IC5-2-6.1-40."
Iowa
Iowa Code §668A. 1(1998).
ff
l. In a trial of a claim involving the request for punitive or exemplary damages, the court
shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make
findings, indicating all of the following:
a. Whether, by a preponderance of clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence, the
conduct of the defendant from which the claim arose constituted willful and wanton
disregard for the rights or safety of another.
b. Whether the conduct of the defendant was directed specifically at the claimant, or at
the person from which the claimant's claim is derived.
2. An award for punitive or exemplary damages shall not be made unless the answer or
finding pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph "a", is affirmative. If such answer or finding
2

is affirmative, the jury, or court if there is no jury, shall fix the amount of punitive or
exemplary damages to be awarded, and such damages shall be ordered paid as follows:
a. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph "b", is affirmative, the full
amount of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded shall be paid to the claimant.
b. If the answer or finding pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph "b", is negative, after
payment of all applicable costs and fees, an amount not to exceed twenty-five percent of
the punitive or exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to the claimant, with the
remainder of the award to be ordered paid into a civil reparations trust fund administered
by the state court administrator. Funds placed in the civil reparations trust shall be under
the control and supervision of the executive council, and shall be disbursed only for
purposes of indigent civil litigation programs or insurance assistance programs."
Kansas: Kan.
Stat. Ann. §60-3402(e) (Expired July 1, 1989) [text of statute not available]
Missouri
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 537.675(3)-(4) (2000).
,f
3. Any party receiving a judgment final for purposes of appeal for punitive damages in
any case filed in any division of any circuit court of the state of Missouri shall notify the
attorney general of the state of Missouri of such award, except for actions claiming
improper health care pursuant to chapter 538, RSMo. The state of Missouri shall have a
lien for deposit into the tort victims' compensation fund to the extent of fifty percent of
the punitive damage final judgment which shall attach in any such case after deducting
attorney's fees and expenses. In each case, the attorney general shall serve a lien notice by
certified mail or registered mail upon the party or parties against whom the state has a
claim for collection of its share of a punitive damage final judgment. On a petition filed
by the state, the court, on written notice to all interested parties, shall adjudicate the rights
of the parties and enforce the lien. The lien shall not be satisfied out of any recovery until
the attorney's claim for fees and expenses is paid. The state can file its lien in all cases
where punitive damages are awarded upon the entry of the judgment final for purposes of
appeal. The state cannot enforce its lien until there is a punitive damage final judgment.
Cases resolved by arbitration, mediation or compromise settlement prior to a punitive
damage final judgment are exempt from the provisions of this section. Nothing in this
section shall hinder or in any way affect the right or ability of the parties to any claim or
lawsuit to compromise or settle such claim or litigation on any terms and at any time the
parties desire.
4. The state of Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene at any stage of any
judicial proceeding pursuant to this section, except to enforce its lien rights as provided in
subsection 3 of this section."
New York
N.Y.C.P.L.R.§8701(1992) (Repealed effective April 1, 1994) [text of statute not
available]
3

Oregon
Or. Rev. Stat. § 18.540 (2003).
(1) Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages, the Department
of Justice shall become a judgment creditor as to the punitive damages portion of the
award to which the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account is entitled pursuant to
paragraph (b) of this subsection, and the punitive damage portion of an award shall be
allocated as follows: b(a) Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party. The attorney
for the prevailing party shall be paid out of the amount allocated under this paragraph, in
the amount agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing party. However, in no
event may more than 20 percent of the amount awarded as punitive damages be paid to
the attorney for the prevailing party.
(b) Sixty percent shall be paid to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account for the
Department of Justice Crime Victims1 Assistance Section to be used for the purposes set
forth in ORS chapter 147. However, if the prevailing party is a public entity, the amount
otherwise payable to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Account shall be paid to the
general fund of the public entity.
(2) The party preparing the proposed judgment shall assure that the judgment identifies
the judgment creditors specified in subsection (1) of this section.
(3) Upon the entry of a verdict including an award of punitive damages, the prevailing
party shall provide notice of the verdict to the Department of Justice. In addition, upon
entry of a judgment based on a verdict that includes an award of punitive damages, the
prevailing party shall provide notice of the judgment to the Department of Justice. The
notices required under this subsection must be in writing and must be delivered to the
Department of Justice Crime Victims1 Assistance Section in Salem, Oregon within five
days after the entry of the verdict or judgment.
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